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WHERE HAS MICHAELS TAKEN US?: ASSESSING
THE FUTURE OF TAINT HEARINGS
I. INTRODUCTION

Although society's disgust with the sexual abuse of children is not
novel, beginning in 1960 and through the 1980s, lay and professional interest in protecting children from sexual abuse flourished. As a result,
2
prosecutions for child sexual abuse grew exponentially. In their zeal to
purge society of such evils, some investigators erred in their questioning
and interviewing techniques of child-victims, utilizing excessively leading
questions and suggestive investigative tactics.3 Consequently, some childwitness's recollections of alleged instances of sexual abuse were "tainted,"
by either implanting memories in the children's minds that had not existed
before, or distorting images that were formerly innocent.4
Within the confines of these overzealous times, a sexual abuse case
against Mar§aret Kelly Michaels (hereinafter referred to as "Michaels")
commenced. Because of Michaels's conviction and subsequent appeals,
the interviewing techniques involved in child sexual abuse litigation became suspect. As a result, in State v. Michaels,6 the New Jersey Supreme
Court announced a new evidentiary procedure which allows pre-trial
hearings to assess a child-witness's reliability before testifying at trial.7
By finding this, New Jersey became the first jurisdiction to extend "taint
hearings" to a child's testimony in sexual abuse cases.
I

See John B. Myers, Taint Hearings for Child Witnesses? A Step in the Wrong

Direction, 46 BAYLOR L.REV. 873, 878 (1994) (detailing legal, social and academic
develo?ment regarding children and sexual abuse).
See id. at 880 (finding the volume of litigation regarding child sexual abuse cases
escalated during the 1980s).
3 Id. One commentator notes that many legal and psychological specialists
were
unaware of the dangers their improper interviewing techniques posed to the defendants and
their prosecutions. Id.
4

Lisa Manshel, The Child Witness and the Presumption of Authenticity After State v.

Michaels, 26 SETON HALL L.REV. 685, 693 & n.48 (1996) (indicating researchers have
found sexual abuse memories can be implanted or misinterpreted in child-victims' minds).
5

See State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 304, 642 A.2d 1372, 1374 (1994) (noting

prosecution of Margaret Kelly Michaels began in 1985).
6
7

136 N.J. 299, 642 A.2d 1372.

See id. at 315-16, 642 A.2d at 1380 (extending taint hearings to the testimony of
child-witnesses in sexual abuse cases).
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A taint hearing involves a pre-trial assessment of the reliability
of an
alleged child-victim's in-court statements as a predicate to the admissibility of the evidence at trial.8 Despite a lack of precedent on the issue, the
New Jersey Supreme Court justified extending pre-trial taint hearings to
child sexual abuse cases to protect a defendant from a denial of due process by excluding tainted evidence and to protect the justice system's integrity. 9 Allowing a taint hearing in these cases provides defendants with
a remedy when the child-accuser's testimony is based upon unreliable perceptions or memory which was created by suggestive investigative techniques. °
After New Jersey's articulation of this new evidentiary procedure,
defendants in other jurisdictions urged their courts to follow the Michaels
precedent and allow a pre-trial assessment of a child-witness's reliability
before the youth can testify at a trial involving sexual abuse." However,
not all states agree with the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling.12 Nevertheless, as this article asserts, a trend is evolving advocating the proposition articulated in Michaels that taint hearings are appropriate in sexual
abuse cases involving children. Part II of this article details the history and
reasoning behind the Michaels decision. It explains the precedent for taint
hearings as well as the prerequisites to trigger the pre-trial assessment.
Part EI of this paper examines how other courts since Michaels address its
holding. This section asserts that despite the varied opinions of state
courts, a trend toward allowing taint hearings is emerging.

8
Id. at 315-16, 642 A.2d at 1381.
9

Id. at 316, 642 A.2d at 1381.
10State v. Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. 579, 632, 625 A.2d 489,
517 (1993), rev'd 136
N.J. 299, 642 A.2d 1372 (1994).
See e.g., Fischbach v. State, No. 245-1985, 1996 WL 145968, at *1 (Del. Supr.
Mar. 15, 1996) (asserting trial court erred in failing to conduct taint hearing);
Commonwealth v. Allen, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 458, 460, 665 N.E.2d 105, 107 (1996) (arguing
for the adoption of the reasoning in Michaels); People v. Michael M., 162 Misc. 2d 803,
804, 618 N.Y.S.2d 171, 174 (1994) (requesting pre-trial hearing to suppress child's
testimony as product of suggestive interviews).
12
See e.g., State v. Allen, No. 94-CA-005944, 1996 WL 48550, at *3 (Ohio App.
Feb. 7, 1996) (refusing to follow Michaels because of lack of precedent on the issue in
Ohio); State v. Smith, No. 95-CA-006070, 1996 WL 27908, at *4 (Ohio App. Jan. 24,
1996) (noting lack of precedent in Ohio giving authority to adopt Michaels); Frohne v.
State, 928 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Tex. App. 1996) (declining to follow Michaels on evidentiary
grounds).
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II. THE MICHAELS DECISIONS

A. Factual Background
In September 1984, Margaret Kelly Michaels began working as a
teacher's aide at Wee Care, a nursery school enrolling approximately sixty
children ages three to five. 13 In October of that year, Michaels was promonths. 14
moted to teacher and continued in that capacity for almost seven
During this time Wee Care received no complaints about Michaels's performance from staff, children or parents.15
As Michaels's employment was drawing to an end, however, a fouryear old Wee Care child, M.P., was brought to his pediatrician to treat a
rash. 16 During the examination, a nurse took M.P.'s temperature rectally
at which time M.P. stated that his teacher, Michaels, had also done this to
him at nap time. 17 The child provided additional instances and details of
sexual abuse prompting his mother to notify the New Jersey Division of
Youth and Family Services (DYFS). 1 DYFS notified the prosecutor's
office of the allegations and an investigation ensued, beginning with interviews of only a small number of children and eventually expanding to all
children who had contact with Michaels.19
These interviews revealed accounts of sexual abuse ranging from minor instances to bizarre and heinous sexual acts.
The prosecutor pro13

State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 304, 642 A.2d 1372, 1374 (1994).

14

Id. In a letter dated April 15, 1985, Michaels gave Wee Care two weeks' notice
that she intended to terminate her employment with them. Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. at 590,
625 A.2d at 495.
15 Michaels, 136 N.J. at 303,
642 A.2d at 1374.
16Id. at 304, 642 A.2d
at 1374.
17

Id.

18

State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 305, 642 A.2d 1372, 1374, 1375 (1994). M.P.
commented additionally that Michaels undressed him and took his and another student's
temperatures daily. Id. at 304, 642 A.2d at 1375. M.P. also stated that Michaels had "hurt"
two other
classmates. Id.
'9
Id. at 305, 642 A.2d at 1375. In total, there were twenty-six months of questioning.
State v. Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. 579, 620, 625 A.2d 489, 510 (1993), rev'd 136 N.J. 299,
642 A.2d 1372 (1994).
20
Id. at 592, 625 A.2d at 496. Some allegations made involved the insertion of
utensils, light bulbs, and legos into genitalia. Id. The children described games where
Michaels and the children were naked and licked peanut butter and/or jelly from various
body parts. Id. Accounts of "intercourse" were relayed as well as one involving cakes made
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ceeded to trial with a 163-count indictment involving aggravated sexual
assault, sexual assault, endangering the welfare of children and making
terroristic threats. 2 At the trial, a large portion of the state's evidence
consisted of the testimony of the Wee Care children who at the time of trial
22
ranged from ages five to seven.
After a nine month trial and twelve days
of deliberation, the jury returned a• •guilty verdict
on 115 counts, sentencing
23
Michaels to forty-seven years imprisonment.
B. The Appellate Division's Decision:Analogies to Pre-IrialEyewitness Identification and Hypnotically-Recalled Testimony

The trial court's decision was reversed and remanded after Michaels
appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, arguing a number of
24
errors made in the lower court.
Among these was the assertion that reversal was required because the child-witnesses were made incompetent to
25
testify by suggestive and coercive interview techniques.
On this issue,

of "pee and poop." Id.
21
Michaels, 136 N.J. at 305, 642 A.2d at 1375. There were three indictments brought
against Michaels with a total of 235 counts. Id. Prior to trial many counts were dismissed
and before going to the jury others received the same fate, therefore, by the time the jury
began deliberations, 131 counts spanning the three indictments remained. Id. at 306, 642
A.2d at 1375.
22
Id. at 305-06, 642 A.2d at 1375.
23
State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 306, 642 A.2d 1372, 1375 (1994).
24
State v. Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. 579, 587-88, 645, 625 A.2d 489, 494, 523
(1993), rev'd 136 N.J. 299, 642 A.2d 1372 (1994). Michaels asserted error on nine
grounds: 1) she was denied due process by the trial court's refusal to allow her experts to
examine the testifying children; 2) the use of closed circuit television testimony was
improper; 3) Eileen Treacy's testimony (an expert witness for the prosecution) pertaining to
Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome should not have been admitted because her methodology
was unreliable and unscientific; 4) Treacy's testimony bolstering the children's credibility
"invaded the province of the jury"; 5) her right to make a defense was violated by the
court's refusal to allow expert testimony on the lack of any indication of deviancy or
pathology; 6) the questioning of the children was so suggestive the children should not have
been competent to testify; 7) the prosecution's closing statement's referral to Michaels as
Hitler unfairly prejudiced the jury against her; 8) the lower court erred when it allowed the
jury to review the children's closed circuit television testimony during their deliberations; 9)
the use of massive hearsay evidence polluted the entire proceeding. Id. at 587-88, 625 A.2d
at 493. Only the children's competence to testify because of suggestive interview
techniques
is relevant to the present discussion.
25 Id.
at 588, 625 A.2d at 493. Note that suggestibility is distinct from deliberate
lying
by a child; suggestibility assumes the child witness has a present belief of having been
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the appeals division agreed with Michaels, holding that at her new trial a
"taint hearing" must be held to evaluate the reliability and subsequent admissibility of the children's testimony. 6
While the appeals court recognized taint hearings as an extraordinary
27

Specifically, the
step, it also noted the practice is not unprecedented.
court justified its extension of the pre-trial hearing procedure by equating
the facts before it with those involving hypnotically-recalled testimony and
28
pre-trial eyewitness identifications.
In both of the latter situations, the
court noted, the judiciary has not hesitated to implement the procedural

protection of a pre-trial hearing to prevent corrupting a potential prosecution with tainted evidence.29

By analogy, the court ruled that like cases

abused. Manshel, supra note 5, at 690. In Michaels, the defense objected to numerous
types of improper interview techniques. Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. at 621, 625 A.2d at 510.
For example, the wording of the investigators' questions planted sexual knowledge and
vocabulary in the children's minds that is not appropriate for children of their ages. Id.
Peer pressure and threats were used to question uncooperative children. Id. One child was
told her friends had already revealed to the investigators that certain things occurred. Id.
These interviewing techniques are considered improper and violate due process. See Myers,
supra26
note 2, at 909-11 (presenting examples of improper interview techniques).
Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. at 631-32, 625 A.2d at 517. The appellate court
held that
"courts must provide a remedy where the record demonstrates that an accuser's testimony is
found upon unreliable perceptions, or memory caused by improper investigative procedures
if it results in a defendant's right to a fair trial being irretrievably lost. A factual hearing
would27be required for this purpose." Id.
Id. The court noted that courts have used taint hearings to determine whether
an incourt identification was tainted by any unduly suggestive identification procedures and
whether hypnotically-recalled testimony is reliable. Id. at 630-31, 625 A.2d at 516-17
(citing U.S. v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380 (3rd Cir. 1991) and State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432
A.2d 86 (1981)). In Stevens, the court required a taint hearing to decide the reliability of an
in-court identification based on possible impermissibly suggestive identification procedures.
Stevens, 935 F.2d at 1388-92. In Hurd, the court found a taint hearing was required to
assess the reliability and subsequent admissibility of hypnotically-recalled testimony. Hurd,
86 N.J. at 548, 432 A.2d at 97-98. The court found such testimony is inadmissible if the
one conducting the hypnotic session uses suggestive techniques amounting to a
constitutional due process violation. Id.
28
Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. at 630-31, 625 A.2d at 516-17. The New York courts
have also noted taint hearings should be allowed because child-witnesses are subject to the
same type of suggestion as those who are under hypnosis and give pre-trial identifications.
People v. Michael M., 162 Misc. 2d 803, 808, 618 N.Y.S.2d 171, 177 (1994).
29
State v. Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. 579, 630-31, 625 A.2d 489, 516-17 (1993),
rev'd 136 N.J. 299, 642 A.2d 1372 (1994); see State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 316, 642
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involving hypnotically-recalled testimony or pre-trial eyewitness identifications, the facts in Michaels require a taint hearing to assess the reliability
30
of the children's testimony to protect against an improper prosecution.
When assessing the reliability and ultimate admissibility of a pre-trial
eyewitness identification, a court should examine, under all the circumstances, whether the procedure used to obtain the identification was so "...
suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that [the
defendant] was denied due process of law."' 31 If the defendant raises an
issue about the procedure used, a taint hearing will be held to determine
32
the reliability and admissibility of the proffered testimony.
If the court
finds the pre-trial identification procedure unduly suggestive, giving rise to
a substantial likelihood of misidentification, the testimony is inadmissible
at trial.33 Similarly, the Michaels court held that if the defendant can make
a showing of "some evidence" that the child's testimony is a result of suggestive and/or coercive interview techniques, the court must hold a pretrial taint hearing to evaluate the reliability of the proposed in-court testi34
mony.
State precedent involving hypnotically-recalled testimony also served
as a beacon to the Michaels court when it permitted taint hearings in child

A.2d 1372, 1381 (1994) (noting that under certain factual scenarios, taint hearings are
necessary to prevent injustice).
30Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. at 631-32, 625 A.2d
at 517.
31
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-302 (1967); see People v.
Blackman, 488
N.Y.S.2d 395, 396, 110 A.2d 596, 597-98 (1985). In Blackman, the court found that a pretrial hearing must be held to determine the appropriateness of admitting an identification
into evidence. Blackman, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 396, 110 A.2d at 597-98. The court held that
these hearings are "designed to reduce the risk that the wrong person will be convicted as a
result of suggestive identification procedures employed by the police." Id.
32 See Mason
v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). In Mason, the defendant
claimed a pre-trial identification procedure was unduly prejudicial so as to fatally taint his
conviction. Id. The court did not agree but stated that, "[freliability is the linchpin in
determining
the admissibility of identification testimony." Id.
33 See
Simmons v. U.S., 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) (finding suggestive
pre-trial
identification inadmissible); Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-02 (recognizing independent
Fourteenth Amendment due process right against identifications which are "unnecessarily
suggestive and conducive to irreparably mistaken identification"); see also, Manshel, supra
note 5, at 712 (noting due process requires such testimony excluded).
34 State v. Michaels,
136 N.J. 299, 320, 642 A.2d 1372, 1383 (1994); cf. U.S. v.
Geiss, 30 M.J. 678, 681 (1990) (declining to apply eyewitness rationale to child sex abuse
cases).
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sexual abuse cases.35 The New Jersey Supreme Court has found the suggestive effect of hypnosis raises questions about the reliability of the proffered testimony.36 An individual under hypnosis is extremely vulnerable
to suggestion, loses critical judgment, and has a tendency to confuse
memories evoked under hypnosis with those recalled prior to the hypnotic
state.37 Consequently, taint hearings are required to assess the reliability
38
and hence the admissibility of hypnotically-induced recall.
The
Michaels court followed this reasoning when determining
a
taint
hearing
39
was required in the child sexual abuse case before it.

C. The New Jersey Supreme Court'sDecision:Establishing Standards
and Prerequisitesfor Taint Hearings
The state sought tbe New Jersey Supreme Court's review of the appellate division's ruling.
The court denied the petition to review on all
counts except the count involving the adoption of a pre-trial hearing to assess the reliability of the alleged child-victims' testimony.4 ' On that issue,
the court upheld the appellate division's holding requiring a taint hearing. 4z
The court reiterated the appeals court's rationale for implementing
such a procedure. It noted that child witnesses are extremely susceptible to
suggestion by adult authority figures because of their "vulnerability, imma-

35Michaels, 136 NJ. at 319, 642 A.2d at 1383; see State v. Hurd,
86 N.J. 525, 548,

432 A.2d 86, 97-98 (1981) (ruling taint hearing necessary when using hypnotically-recalled
testimony).
36 See Hurd,
86 N.J. at 546-47, 432 A.2d at 97 (observing potential error
and
consequent risk of injustice hypnotically-recalled testimony can cause).
37
Id. at 539-40, 432 A.2d at 93-94.
38
Id. at 542, 432 A.2d at 95. The Hurd court noted the "traditional procedural
safeguards such as cross-examination and an opportunity to observe a witness's demeanor
are not sufficient" to protect the defendant against improper evidence. Id.
39
State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 320, 642 A.2d 1372, 1382 (1994).
40
Id. at 303, 642 A.2d at 1374. The court phrased the determinative issue as follows:
"whether the interview techniques used by the state in this case were so coercive or
suggestive that they had a capacity to distort substantially the children's recollection of
actual events and this compromised the reliability of the children's statements and testimony
based on their recollections." Id. at 308-09, 642 A.2d at 1377.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 324, 642 A.2d at 1385.
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turity, and impressionability. ' 43 As such, a child's responses can be
shaped by a suggestive interviewer and recollections of actual events can
be distorted." Therefore, interviews with children possibly involved in
sexual abuse must be conducted free of suggestion and coercion to ensure
a child-witness's recollections and subsequent testimony are a result of his
or her own recall. 45 The court reasoned that, to ensure the reliability of a
child's memory and the absence of 46improper interview procedures, a taint
hearing is an appropriate technique.
To trigger such a hearing, the defendant must first present "some evidence" that the child's testimony is a result of improper investigative procedures. 47 If the court finds that the defendant meets this threshold stan43

Id. at 308, 642 A.2d at 1376; see Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S.
805, 812-13 (1990)
(recognizing susceptibility of child-witnesses to suggestion). Most researchers agree that on
average very young children are more easily influenced by suggestion than adults. Manshel,
supra note 5, at 691.
State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 309, 642 A. 2d 1372, 1377 (1994). The Michaels
court adopts a "memory error" model of suggestibility, assuming false memories are created
in the child's mind by the suggestive influence of the interviewer. Manshel, supra note 5, at
693. 45
Michaels, 136 N.J. at 309, 311,642 A.2d at 1377, 1378. Suggestiveness
alone does
not violate the Due Process Clause. See Myers, supra note 2, at 906 (noting all interviews
have some suggestion present). A proper interview should begin by building a rapport with
a child, treating her as a child, not as a young adult. Id. at 907. Interviewers should use
praise moderately and not only when the child provides an answer the interviewer "wants"
to hear. Id. at 907-08. Open-ended questions that invite narrative responses are favored
over highly leading questions such as "[h]e touched your pee pee, didn't he?" Id. at 908,
910. The interviewer must remain neutral and independent of the investigation. Michaels,
136 N.J. at 309, 642 A.2d at 1377. Incessantly repeating questions is another improper
technique. Id. at 310, 642 A.2d at 1377. If the child gives a negative response and the
interviewer asks the questions again, the child, thinking her first answer was incorrect, is
likely to make an affirmative answer the second time. Id. In addition, the interviewer
should refrain from vilifying the defendant, thereby placing the interviewer's bias onto the
child. Id.; see Myers, supra note 2, at 910 (detailing procedures interviewers should not use
when questioning children).
46
Michaels, 136 N.J. at 315-16, 642 A.2d at 1380.
47 Id.
at 320, 642 A.2d at 1383. The court should consider all relevant
factors when
determining if this threshold burden is met, including the circumstances of the questions, the
manner and form of the interrogatories, the person to whom the statements were made, the
physical and mental conditions of the victim, the use of inducements, threats, or bribes, and
whether or not the statements were inherently believable. Andres Winerman, The Use and
Misuse of Anatomically Correct Dolls in Child Sexual Abuse Evaluations: Uncovering Fact
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dard, the court will hold a pre-trial taint hearing to decide if ".. . the investigatory interviews and interrogatories were so suggestive that they give
rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparably mistaken
or false recollection
guilt.' 48
of material facts bearing on the defendant's
In Michaels, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that Michaels produced "some evidence" that the investigative procedures used were highly
improper.49 As such, if retried, a hearing must be held to determine if the
techniques were so suggestive and coercive as to taint the children's testimony concerning Michaels's alleged sexual abuse of them."
At this
hearing the state has the burden of proving through clear and convincing
evidence that• the
testimony is reliable despite some suggestive or
•51proffered
.
coercive interview procedures. If the state does not meet its burden, such
evidence is deemed unreliable and therefore is not admissible at trial.52

III. ANALYSIS: TREND TOWARD EXPANSION AFTER MICHAELS
Since Michaels, many defendants urged their jurisdictions to adopt the
taint hearing procedures promulgated in that decision.53 Texas, Ohio, New
York, Delaware, Massachusetts and the military courts have all been pre-

...Or Fantasy?,

16 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 347, 358 (1995).
Michaels, 136 NJ. at 320, 642 A.2d at 1383.
49
State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 313, 315, 642 A.2d 1372, 1379, 1380 (1994).
50 Id. at 315-16,
642 A.2d at 1380. As of the publication of this article, the state
has
not elected
to
retry
the
case.
5'
Id. at 321, 642 A.2d at 1383. The state must prove that when the
court considers
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interview, the testimony still retains a
"degree of reliability sufficient to outweigh the effects of the improper interview
techniques." Id. To meet its burden, the state may choose to call experts to testify to the
lack of suggestive effects the interview may have had or offer independent testimony
indicating the reliability of the child's testimony. Id. In response, the defendant may offer
expert testimony attesting to the suggestiveness present in the interrogations. Id. The focus
of the hearing is the questioning techniques utilized, not the child witness herself. Id. at
322, 642 A.2d at 1383-84. In pursuit of this goal, it is very unlikely that the child must be
present at or testify at the hearing itself. Stephen J. Ceci, Maggie Bruck & Robert
Rosenthal, Children'sAllegations of Sexual Abuse: Forensicand Scientific Issues: A Reply
to Commentators,
1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L 494, 512 (1995).
52 Michaels,
136 N.J. at 316, 642 A.2d at 1380. The court notes that if such evidence
were allowed, the defendant's right of due process would be violated. Id.
53 See supra
notes I I and 12 and accompanying text (listing courts that
have
addressed taint hearings in sexual abuse cases after Michaels).
48
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sented with the issue.5 4 Upon examination of the decisions handed down
by these courts, there appears to be a developing trend towards allowing
taint hearings despite some jurisdictions' denial of the hearing's propriety.
New York and Delaware have specifically adopted taint hearings
through case law." The most recent New York courts used the identical
arguments proffered in Michaels to conclude that taint hearings in child
sexual abuse cases were warranted in certain circumstances. 56 In addition
54

Id.; see U.S. v. Geiss, 30 M.J. 678, 681 (1990) (addressing whether to adopt taint
hearings in child sexual abuse cases).
See Fischbach v. State, No. 245-1985, 1996 WL 145968, at *2 (Del. Supr. Mar. 15,
1996) (adopting taint hearings); People v. Michael M., 162 Misc. 2d 803, 810, 618
N.Y.S.2d
171, 178 (1994) (agreeing with Michaels decision).
56 Michael M.,
162 Misc. 2d at 803-10, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 171-74. The Michael M.
court reasoned that taint hearings in child sexual abuse cases are allowed; the court
employed the same reasoning that permits taint hearings in cases involving eyewitness
identification and hypnotically-enhanced testimony. Id. at 808, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 176. In
addition, the court cited various psychological studies indicating that a child-witness's
testimony can be shaped by suggestive, interviewing techniques. Id. at 808-09, 618
N.Y.S.2d at 177. Finally, the court noted various state and federal decisions that recognized
a child's susceptibility. Id. at 808-810, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 177. See Idaho v. Wright, 497
U.S. 805, 813 (1990) (noting children are susceptible to suggestion and can be misleAd by
leading questions); People v. Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d 741, 748 (Colo. 1989) (considering
child-witness's age in reliability analysis); State v. Erickson, 454 N.W.2d 624, 627 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1990) (citing study stating that unwanted children are vulnerable to "malicious
suggestion"); People v. Hudy, 73 NY.2d 40, 57, 535 N.E.2d 250, 270 (1988) (stating that
child-witnesses are impressionable); People v. Alvarez, 159 Misc. 2d 963, 964, 607
N.Y.S.2d 573, 573-74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (citing Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 535 N.E.2d 250);
State v. Hadfield, 788 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah 1990) (examining suggestive techniques used to
manipulate child-witness's testimony). The Michael M. court's finding specifically
overruled existing New York precedent disallowing such.hearings. See Alvarez, 159 Misc.
2d at 965, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 574 (refusing to extend taint hearings in sexual abuse cases
involving child-victims). In Alvarez, the defendant, indicted on multiple charges involving
sodomy, sexual abuse, and endangering the welfare of a child, requested a pre-trial hearing
to assess the extent to which suggestive questioning tainted the child-witness's testimony.
Id. at 963, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 573. The court refused to allow a taint hearing in this case
based on the lack of authority on the matter, as well as concern for the children's well-being
during the additional proceeding. Id. at 965, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 574. In overturning this
holding, the court in Michael M. first stated that a lack of precedent on a matter does not
prevent a court from acting. Michael M., 162 Misc. 2d at 810, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
Second, the court tempered the argument concerning the children's well being by stating
that not all children would be required to take part in such hearings. Id. Such a hearing
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to adopting the rationale behind the Michaels decision, the New York
courts adopted the procedures and parameters of the hearing established in
that case.
In contrast, Delaware courts adopted the premise of taint
hearings,
but
refused to follow the formal procedures articulated in
•
58
Michaels. Nevertheless, the Delaware court recognized the need for an
assessment of a child-witness's reliability
due to possible impermissibly
59
suggestive questioning techniques.
Those jurisdictions choosing to dismiss the propriety of taint hearings
in child sexual abuse cases have either failed to explain their reasoning or
offered weak reasoning.6
The Ohio courts refused to adopt the taint
would only be held after a showing that the interview techniques were unduly suggestive.
Id. The court concluded that a defendant's right to a fair trial must supersede a child's
inconvenience
once the defendant establishes the use of suggestive techniques. Id.
51 Id. at 812,
618 N.Y.S.2d at 179. For a defendant to be granted such a hearing,
he
or she must make a showing of suggestiveness in the interview techniques. Id. Once
established, the prosecution, because of its control of the information regarding the childwitness's initial interview, will have to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
child's testimony is not tainted. Id. The court noted that such an assessment does not
require the child's presence, but rather notes and tapes of interviews, expert testimony, and
testimony
of those present at the questioning are admissible. Id.
58 See Fischbach,
1996 WL 145968, at *2 (declining to adopt formal procedures for
taint hearings outlined in Michaels). In Fischbach, the defendant, convicted of unlawful
sexual penetration, argued the trial court erred by failing to suppress the child-victim's
videotaped statement. Id. at * 1. The defendant asserted that improper interview techniques
tainted the child's testimony, therefore a taint hearing should have occurred to prove the
reliability of the child's accusations. Id. at *2. At the taint hearing, the defendant argued,
the state would have the burden of establishing the child's reliability. Id. The court found
that a child's testimony could be impermissibly suggestive; however, a formal taint hearing,
such as the one articulated in Michaels, would not be adopted by the Delaware courts. Id.
Instead, the court announced that it is up to the trial court to determine, considering the
totality of the circumstances, whether the child's testimony is reliable. Id.
59
Id. The court held that "[i]f a witness's statement is obtained by use of
impermissible interviewing techniques, as alleged here, the trial court must determine
whether the statement is reliable after considering the totality of the circumstances." Id.
60
See U.S. v. Geiss, 30 M.J. 678, 681 (1990) (holding taint hearings unnecessary
under MIL. R. EVID. 601); State v. Allen, No. 94-CA-005944, 1996 WL 48550, at *3
(Ohio. App. Feb. 7, 1996) (refusing to adopt taint hearings because of lack of Ohio
precedent); State v. Smith, No. 95-CA-006070, 1996 WL 27908, at *4 (Ohio App. Jan. 24,
1996) (finding no current requirement for a taint hearing in child abuse cases); Frohne v.
State, 928 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Tex. App. 1996) (finding taint hearings disallowed under TEX.
R. EVID. 602).
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hearing procedure because no precedent exists in that jurisdiction requiring
the courts to conduct a pre-trial assessment of a child-witness's potential
contamination. 6 l Those courts conduct no further inquiry into the necessity or legal appropriateness of taint hearings in child sexual abuse cases.62
The Texas and military courts, which also decline to adopt taint
hearings, base their refusal on general evidence arguments. 63 Neither jurisdiction addresses or examines the myriad of psychological studies that
attest to a child's suggestibility, nor do they specifically refute the detailed
arguments expounded in Michaels.64 Instead, both summarily dismiss the
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See supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining why Ohio
courts refuse to
adopt Michaels decision). In Allen, the court declined to hold a pre-trial hearing even if a
child-witness is "potentially contaminated" by suggestive interview techniques, reasoning
that no Ohio appellate court has adopted the taint hearing procedure. Allen, 1996 WL
48550, at *3. In Smith, the court noted that "[there currently is no requirement in Ohio that
a taint hearing be held in cases of alleged child abuse." Smith, 1996 WL 27908, at *4. This
"lack of precedent" argument was expressly denounced in the New York courts. People v.
Michael M., 162 Misc. 2d 803, 810, 618 N.Y.S.2d 171, 178 (1994). In Michael M., the
court noted that a lack of specific authority on a matter does not prevent a court from taking
action, especially where the issue pertains to the reliability of evidence at trial. Id.
62
See Allen, 1996 WL 48550 at *3 (limiting analysis to "lack of precedent"
argument); Smith 1996 WL 27908, at *4 (offering no further arguments besides "no
precedent"
on this issue).
63 See Geiss, 30 M.J.
at 681; Frohne, 928 S.W.2d at 575 (asserting Texas Rules of
Evidence allow any witness with personal knowledge to testify). In Geiss, the court cited
Military Rule of Evidence 601 which notes that "every person is competent to be a witness.
... Geiss, 30 M.J. at 681. The court found that child-witnesses are presumably able to
testify at trial and any questions regarding suggestive and coercive interview tactics are
questions of credibility. Id. As such, cross examination, expert testimony, corroborating or
contradictory evidence and cautionary jury instructions serve as adequate safeguards to a
defendant's rights and as a means to test the child-witness's credibility. Id. Therefore, a
taint hearing is not required. Id.
In Frohne, the court announced that the Michaels opinion cannot be reconciled with Texas
Rule of Evidence 602, which states that any witness with personal knowledge may testify.
Frohne, 928 S.W.2d at 575. Therefore, a child-witness who is the alleged victim in a sexual
abuse case is competent to testify because he or she has personal knowledge of the incident
in question. Id. As such, a taint hearing is not required. Id.
64 See
Geiss, 30 M.J. at 681 (addressing taint hearing solely in context
of evidence
rules); Frohne, 928 S.W.2d at 575 (limiting discussion to Texas Rules of Evidence
analysis).
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taint hearing process without fully examining the issue on its merits
65 or exholding.
Michaels
the
with
found
they
problems
specific
plaining
Some courts that decline to follow Michaels justify their refusal to
agree with the arguments proffered in Michaels, yet proceed to distinguish
the facts before them from those in Michaels.66 These courts do not attack
the legal and psychological foundations behind Michaels but rather distin65

See supra, note 64 and accompanying text (noting that Frohne
contains limited

discussion of taint hearing issue). In Frohne, the court also noted that since Michaels was
non-binding authority from another jurisdiction, the court would not address it. Frohne v.
State, 926 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Tex. App. 1996). However, defendants asked both the New
York and Delaware courts to follow Michaels despite its non-binding status. See Fischbach
v. State, No. 245-1985, 1996 WL 145968, at *1 (Del. Supr. Mar. 15, 1996); Michael M.,
162 Misc. 2d at 810. Both jurisdictions were persuaded by each defendants' arguments and
adopted the premise, if not the actual procedure, of taint hearings articulated in Michaels.
Fischbach,
1996 WL 145968, at *2; MichaelM., 162 Misc. 2d at 808-10.
66 See U.S. v. Kibler,
43 M.J. 725, 728 (1995) (distinguishing factual situation in the
case at bar from Michaels); State v. Smith, No. 95-CA-006070, 1996 WL 27908, at *4
(Ohio App. Jan. 24, 1996) (finding no taint hearing allowed because defendant never moved
for hearing prior to trial). In Smith, the court declined to implement a taint hearing
requirement in Ohio, basing its decision on the lack of precedent. Smith, 1996 WL 27908, at
*4. The court then continued by stating that even if Ohio had adopted such a procedure, its
use would be inappropriate in the case before it because the defendant never moved for a
taint hearing prior to trial, a requirement established in Michaels. Id.
In Kibler, the court determined a taint hearing was inappropriate, basing its decisions on the
doctrine of waiver. Kibler, 43 M.J. at 727. The court noted that since the defendant failed to
raise a motion or objection concerning the child-witness's reliability at trial, under the Rules
for Courts-Martial 801(g) and 905(e), the defendant waived such issues on appeal. Id.
Nevertheless, after asserting this position in three short paragraphs, the court proceeded in
ten paragraphs of dicta to distinguish the facts before it from those presented in Michaels.
Id. at 727-29.
The Kibler court found three factual deficiencies in the case before it which distinguished it
from Michaels making a taint hearing inappropriate, assuming arguendo, that the doctrine
of waiver did not apply. Id. at 727. The Kibler court declined to follow Michaels for three
reasons. Id. at 728. First, the court found that the government's case did not consist
primarily of the alleged child-victim's testimony unlike the situation in Michaels. Id.
Second, in Kibler, the prosecution's case against the defendant in the present case did not
hinge solely on the findings of the social workers and law enforcement officials, as was the
case in Michaels. Id. Finally, unlike the Michaels facts, the government in Kibler presented
ample medical, physical, and behavioral evidence to support the children's allegations. Id.
Because of these differences, the court noted it would have declined to allow a taint hearing
in the case. Id.
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67

they weaken their arguBy doing so,
guish the factual circumstances.
68
inappropriate.
is
holding
Michaels
the
that
ment
Finally, the jurisdictions declining to adopt the Michaels procedure
70
In U.S. v. Geiss, the military
are not following their own precedent.
courts declined to adopt taint hearings, basing its decision on the fact that
Military Rule of Evidence 601 contains a presumption that a witness is
competent to testify at trial. 7' Any problems concerning suggestive interview techniques could adequately be addressed through cross-examination,
72
Five years later, the question
expert witnesses and similar trial tactics.
again crossed the military court's bench; this time the court made no mention of the Geiss decision nor that court's specific refusal to adopt taint
hearings. 3 Implementation of the procedure in this later case was declined on other grounds; nevertheless, the court proceeded to discuss the
impropriety of taint hearings in the case before it, centering its discussion
not on the precedent articulated in Geiss, but rather on factual dissimilari74
ties with Michaels.

III. CONCLUSION
As a result of the Michaels decision, a new evidentiary procedure has
emerged regarding children's testimony in sexual abuse cases. While
supra, note 66 and accompanying text (detailing decisions that refuse
to adopt
taint hearings yet distinguish facts before it from Michaels).
68Id. Massachusetts courts have also been presented with the Michaels
argument that
67See

taint hearings are appropriate in certain circumstances. Commonwealth v. Allen, 40 Mass.
App. Ct. 458, 460-62, 665 N.E.2d 105, 107 (1996). In Allen, the court declined to
specifically address the propriety of taint hearings in child sexual abuse cases, leaving that
decision for another day. Id. at 462. Nevertheless, the court proceeded to engage in a
factual analysis of the case before it and those facts present in Michaels, finding that the
present defendant did not present any evidence of suggestibility. Id. at 462-64. Without
meeting the threshold requirement of suggestibility, the court said, the defendant will never
be entitled to a taint hearing. Id. at 464 The court found that since this requirement was not
met, the question of the propriety of taint hearings would be left for another day. Id.
69See Kibler, 43 M.J. at 727-29 (refusing to adopt taint hearings,
basing its argument
not precedent.)
on facts
70 30
MJ. 678 (1990).
71
72

Id. at 678.
Id.

73See
74

Id.

supra, note 66 and accompanying text (explaining Kibler holding)
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those jurisdictions who have been urged to adopt the Michaels holding
have varied opinions on the matter, a trend toward allowing such hearings
is developing. Certain jurisdictions have specifically adopted taint hearings. Those jurisdictions that decline to do so ground their arguments in
weak reasoning, fail to follow precedent, and publish counterargumentative dicta. As a result, examining the decisions promulgated by
the various courts presented with the taint hearing issue indicates that jurisdictions that have yet to address the propriety of taint hearings, may
soon be proponents of them.
Julie A. Jablonski

